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INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act1 (“NLRA”) has had a rough
half-century. After decades of judicial and administrative limitations
on the Act’s effectiveness, today, many of labor’s supporters are
2
among the loudest critics of labor’s law. One reason the law has fallen so far short of expectations is the tendency of the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) and the courts to read the NLRA narrowly
and allow another legal regime—whether common law or statutory—
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J.D., 2012, Harvard Law School; B.A., 2007, Harvard College. Special thanks to my adviser, Ben Sachs, my wife, Brittani, and my parents, for all your ideas and all your patients.
Thanks also to the Journal of Constitutional Law Editorial Board for all your work.
Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169
(2006)).
As early as 1983, unions still counted 20.1% of the workforce as members, compared to
11.3% in 2012. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2012 (Jan.
23, 2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. It was in these
early days that the AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland suggested that unions would be better off repealing the NLRA and returning to the “law of the jungle.” Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a ‘Dead Letter,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at
A8. While labor law scholars have generally not gone that far, many have called for fundamental reforms. See generally JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF
U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–1994 (1995); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 241–306 (1990); Robert J.
Pleasure & Patricia Greenfield, Toward Fundamental Change in U.S. Labor Law: A Law Reform Framework in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 125–36 (Sheldon
Friedman, et al. eds., 1994); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1569 (2002) (suggesting labor law reform at state or local levels);
Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized
Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 61–62 (1994) (arguing for reform to move away from
collective bargaining); Keith N. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in America, 49
WAYNE L. REV. 685 698–702 (2003) (arguing for labor law reform that aims to slow the
decline of unions); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the
Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 660 (2010)(analyzing default and altering rules to point towards revised labor law).
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to settle the case at bar.3 This tendency has attracted scholarly criti4
cism. Yet, one basic question has gone unasked and unanswered. If
courts have simply decided that the NLRA deserves less deference
than other statutes with conflicting text or principles, what is wrong
with that?
5
This Article attempts to answer that question. It argues that the
NLRA is a “super-statute,” worthy of special deference from the
3

4

5

See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149–51 (2002) (holding that undocumented workers who have had their NLRA rights violated cannot recover
damages because such a result would violate the spirit, if not the text, of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act, Pub L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)). See also Lechmere,
Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992) (holding that employers’ right to exclude union
organizers from their property for any reason trumps union organizers’ right to contact
workers); Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 305, 308 (1994) (“The [C]ourt allowed this naked property right to trump the substantial statutory interests of organized employees.”). Brown University excluded graduate
student teachers from the Act’s coverage in part to protect academic freedom, a concern
that the Board decided precluded collective bargaining with graduate students. 342
N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004); Elizabeth Butler Baum, Casenote, NLRB Refuses to Harm “Academic Freedom” at Universities by Permitting Graduate Students to Unionize, 56 MERCER L. REV.
793, 801 (2005).
See, e.g., Denise A. Calderon-Barrera, Hoffman v. NLRB: Leaving Undocumented Workers
Unprotected Under United States Labor Laws?, 6 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 119 (2003) (arguing
that Hoffman Plastic undercut the protection available to undocumented workers under
U.S. labor laws); Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103 (2003) (criticizing the NLRB’s decision of
granting “employee” status to undocumented workers but denying backpay remedies);
Cynthia A. Estlund, Labor, Property and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305
(1994) (arguing that Lechmere represents an overbroad conception of the “right to exclude” supported neither by the NRLA nor state property law); Andrew S. Lewinter,
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB: An Invitation to Exploit, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 509
(2003) (arguing that the “Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic is inconsistent with
both labor and immigration policy”); Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569,
582–83 (2007) (criticizing the “dubious policy grounds” of limiting the coverage of the
Act); Sarah J. Bannister, Note, Low Wages, Long Hours, Bad Working Conditions: Science and
Engineering Graduate Students Should be Considered Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 124–25 (2005) (arguing that the “decision to deny
graduate students ‘employee’ status under the NLRB is unjustified and irreconcilable”
with the reality of graduate work); Ryan Patrick Dunn, Comment, Get a Real Job! The National Labor Relations Board Decides Graduate Student Workers at Private Universities are Not
“Employees” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 851, 855 (2006)
(“[T]he Board’s tradition of interpreting the NLRA exclusively through adjudication . . . reduces the reliability of its decisions.”).
While this Article will argue that the NLRA should receive a purposivist reading, it does
not delve into exactly what the purpose of the statute is, particularly as it has been
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136. For this reason, this Article essentially ignores Taft-Hartley. While that law is certainly relevant to
how the NLRA’s core purpose should be interpreted, it is not clear how or why a limiting
amendment to a super-statute necessarily makes the statute less than super. Where the
Taft-Hartley Act did not modify the provisions of the NLRA, those provisions should be
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courts and vigorous enforcement by the Board. Because it passed after a prolonged period of informed and contentious public deliberation, the NLRA should be treated as more than an everyday public
law.
In Part I, I define “super-statutes” and argue that they should be
given special deference by the courts. In Part II, I analyze the administrative and political decisions made by key policymakers prior to
passage of the NLRA and argue that the Act is a super-statute. Finally, in Part III, I examine the implications of treating the NLRA as a
super-statute by discussing a case that would have gone the other way
if the Supreme Court had used a super-statute analysis.
I. WHAT IS A SUPER-STATUTE?
Much of the debate between judicial liberals and judicial conservatives can be summarized as a disagreement about which mechanisms are appropriate for expanding legal rights. Liberals have historically been more comfortable expanding rights by whatever means
is available, including, in many cases, by judicial fiat. This has left liberals open to accusations of countermajoritarianism. Whatever the
value of civil rights, some have argued, they should not come from
unelected judges implementing values not shared by a majority of the
6
American people. Whether or not this criticism is made in good
7
faith, it is made; and even some liberals find it to have merit.
Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have added something important to this ongoing discussion: a theory of progressive
constitutionalism that is both democratic and resistant to the ebbs
8
and flows of popular prejudice. They argue that some statutes play a

6
7

8

given their original intent as part of the purposivist inquiry discussed in Part III. However, a full exploration of the role of later enactments on a super-statute, while a worthwhile
inquiry, is beyond the scope of this Article.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962).
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 7 (1999). While Sunstein is not opposed to all judicial review, his chosen approach is a jurisprudence in which “judges know that they may be prone to error, and for
this reason they are usually cautious about foreclosing outcomes of political processes
that do not accord with an ambitious and possibly incorrect understanding of democratic
ideals.” Id. at 26.
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory has evolved through a series of articles. See William
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215–16 (2001); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., America’s Statutory “Constitution,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2007). And,
most recently, the theory is explained in a book. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN
FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES].
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role analogous to that of constitutional amendments. These “superstatutes” are impervious to changing electoral coalitions; they are
protected by the judiciary even beyond the four corners of their text;
and they are capable of evolving so that they remain effective as times
change. Eskridge and Ferejohn identify a large number of candidates for super-statute status, ranging from Title VII of the Civil
9
Rights Act of 1964 to the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act.
At first glance, Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory is both descriptively and normatively compelling. Descriptively, it accounts for American history better than a strictly constitutional view of American
rights. Most Americans asked to list the basic guarantees associated
with American citizenship would likely mention at least a few rights
that can be found only in statutes. The right to be free of racial dis10
crimination in the private workplace is the best example. Eskridge
and Ferejohn have captured an important truth about America’s legal history by recognizing that these rights are closer to constitutional
principles than to run-of-the-mill public laws.
Perhaps more important, Eskridge and Ferejohn offer a means for
expanding rights that is less resistant to change than the constitutional amendment process prescribed by Article V of the U.S. Consti11
tution. And, super-statutes need not share constitutional law’s libertarian bias. They can do more than restrain government; they can
impose obligations on government and private actors that may provide more concrete fulfillment to most citizens than the purely nega12
tive rights guaranteed by most constitutional amendments.
Eskridge and Ferejohn describe three basic characteristics that define super-statutes. First, super-statutes pass after an unusually in13
tense period of public deliberation. Second, super-statutes require
cooperation by several institutions working “together as well as pro14
Finally, super-statutes become entecting their own authority.”

9
10
11
12
13

14

See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 26.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 48–49.
Id. at 5, 26, 40–42.
Id. at 7, 26; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-statutes, supra note 8, at 1230–31 (finding that super-statutes substantially alter the “then-existing regulatory baselines” with a new principle or policy and often emerge after a “lengthy period of public discussion and official
deliberation”).
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 7; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-statutes, supra note 8, at 1231 (arguing that an “essential feature of the superstatute” is the “feedback loop” among the various branches, including “elaboration [of
the super-statute] from administrators and judges, whose work is then subject to meaningful scrutiny and correction by the legislature or even the citizenry”).
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trenched over time as courts and other actors treat them with special
15
deference.
This final element of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s definition bears
discussion. If super-statutes, by definition, become and remain entrenched in American culture over time, then super-statute theory
has little prescriptive force. Imagine that judges, as a group, began to
limit the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the narrowest possible reading of
its text. A scholar sympathetic to super-statutes might well conclude
that those judges had done something wrong; they failed to defer to a
super-statute. But the judges would have an easy response: if we do
not defer to the Act, then it is not a super-statute.
This Article rejects Eskridge and Ferejohn’s definition of superstatutes as only those laws that remain entrenched over time. It
therefore cannot rely on standard judicial practice to justify treating
super-statutes with special deference. As a matter of empirical fact,
16
This
courts may often fail to give super-statutes special respect.
premise raises the normative question in its pure form: given that
judges may not always treat super-statutes with special respect, can we
find normatively compelling reasons why they should do so? This Article argues that the answer is yes, and the remainder of this Part is
devoted to explaining what those reasons might be.
A. The Democracy Rationale
This Article’s emphasis on super-statutes reflects in part the notion that, in a democracy, laws that more closely reflect the popular
will have special legitimacy. Professor Bruce Ackerman has taken this
17
argument one step further. In his We the People series, Ackerman distinguishes between two types of lawmaking: higher and lower. When
Congress, exercising powers delegated by the people, enacts public
laws, it is engaged in lower lawmaking. Higher lawmaking occurs
18
when the people themselves exercise lawmaking authority.
Ackerman points to three “constitutional moments” during which
Americans engaged in higher lawmaking: the Founding, Reconstruc-

15
16
17

18

ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 7, 26.
The NLRA presents one instance in which, as this Article will argue, courts have failed to
provide a super-statute with even average respect.
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS].
See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 3–33.
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tion, and the New Deal.19 In each of these periods, Americans became unusually engaged in the lawmaking process and effected fundamental changes in the country’s legal framework. But, none of
these periods of higher lawmaking followed the formal rules for
amending the Constitution. The Founders rejected the amendment
process contained in the Articles of Confederation and invented new
20
rules to meet their needs. The Reconstruction Congress manipulated the requirements for state participation in the ratification of new
21
constitutional amendments. And, the New Deal’s changes in consti22
tutional law occurred entirely outside of the Article V process. Yet,
each of these eras produced lasting changes in constitutional law that
23
are now almost universally accepted.
Ackerman approves of this unorthodox amendment process. In
part, he believes that it reflects a fair reading of the Constitution’s
prescribed procedure for its own amendment, a proposition his crit24
ics find far-fetched. But, Ackerman also justifies his theory on more
functionalist grounds. From time to time, Americans find that some
part of their system of government requires a general overhaul that
they can trust to last beyond the next election cycle. Sometimes, they
express this belief through a constitutional amendment; sometimes
they do not. The decision about whether to amend the Constitution
25
often has as much to do with political contingency as with principle.
19

20
21
22
23

24

25

ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 58. He has subsequently expanded his theory
to include other periods of constitutional change, including the civil rights era. See Bruce
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 (2007) (“A second great
pathway involves the enactment of landmark statues that express the new regime’s basic
principles . . . [such as] the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s.”).
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 17, at 34.
Id. at 99, 101–04, 110–11.
Id. at 337–342.
The change in constitutional interpretation that came with the New Deal is both less likely to be accepted and less likely to be thought of as a change in constitutional law comparable to the change that comes with a constitutional amendment. Ackerman devotes
much of WE THE PEOPLE’s second volume to explaining why the New Deal should be considered a constitutional moment on par with the Founding and Reconstruction. See id. at
255–382. However, one need not accept this claim to accept the considerably less ambitious argument made in this Article.
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common Law of Higher Lawmaking, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731, 1742–46 (1999) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1239–45
(1995) (“Professor Ackerman has failed to exercise such care in constitutional interpretation.”).
Ackerman argues persuasively that the Reconstruction Congress would likely not have
pursued constitutional change had Lincoln lived and been able to appoint a more civil
rights-friendly Supreme Court. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 17, at 265,
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But, however they express themselves, the people have a right to
change their governing institutions when they express a clear desire
to do so.
In the constitutional context, Ackerman’s thesis is fairly radical
26
and has been widely criticized. But, his basic premise—that some
lawmaking is higher than other lawmaking—has both intuitive and
theoretical appeal. Ackerman has simply pointed out that not all laws
are created equal. America has experienced moments when the
people themselves are more actively engaged in the lawmaking process. While it may be difficult to say when exactly the people engage
in higher lawmaking, surely courts can distinguish between the Civil
Rights Act of 1964—passed after extensive public debate with the
whole world watching—and the latest special-interest giveaway drafted by industry lobbyists and rammed through Congress in the dead
of night. In a country founded on republican principles, courts
should treat the former with more respect than the latter.
B. The Epistemic Rationale
One way to think of super-statutes is as pieces of legislation produced by a process that is closer to direct democracy than the traditional legislative process. Super-statutes are passed when citizens are
focused on a particular issue. At these times, lawmakers who want to
be reelected are more likely to defer to their constituents on whatever issue has caught the public eye. More so than other laws, superstatutes are therefore the product of the popular will, not the will of
government officials.
If we had reason to believe that the popular will is more likely to
be correct, this would provide a reason to defer to super-statutes; and,
we do. As the Marquis de Condorcet demonstrated in the 1700s, un-

26

274–78. By the same token, the New Dealers might have pursued a constitutional
amendment, a strategy that was pursued up until the 1937 Switch in Time, had FDR died
and his appointments been made by conservative Vice President, John Garner. Id. at
271–74.
See Gerhardt, supra note 24, at 1735–36, 1767–73 (asserting Ackerman inconsistently follows his methodology); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 115, 117 (1994) (challenging Ackerman’s theory of constitutional interpretation because it runs counter to the importance of the text); Tribe, supra note 24,
at 1240 (“Professor Ackerman has failed to exercise such care in constitutional interpretation.”); see generally Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique
of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992) (reviewing
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991)) (considering critically
Ackerman’s thesis); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918,
918 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)) (finding that Ackerman’s theory is “mired in a fictional past and envisions a utopian future”).
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der certain circumstances, larger groups are more likely to find the
27
right answer to tough questions. But Condorcet’s “Jury Theorem”
only applies in certain circumstances. It provides a compelling reason to defer to legislative enactments, but only when its preconditions
28
are met. Thus, the Jury Theorem provides both a potential justification for the idea of a super-statute and the means for setting some
guidelines on what a super-statute is.
1. Condorcet’s Requirements
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem is a mathematical proof, not a sociological observation. It shows that when a large number of people
provide answers to a common question, even if each answer is only
slightly more likely to be right than wrong, the chances that a majority of predictions will be correct approaches 100% as the number of
29
predictions rises. Legal scholars have applied Condorcet’s insight to
30
democratic decision-making. If groups make better decisions than
even expert individuals, democracy—a mechanism for letting groups
make decisions—should be more likely than other systems to get the
right answer to tough questions. The conclusion seems to flow naturally from the premise, but the devil is in the details. According to
the original Jury Theorem, crowds are wise only when three conditions are met: the question being asked has right and wrong answers;
the members of the group answering it are, on average, more likely to
be right than to be wrong; and the answers of individual group mem31
bers are independent of each other.

27

28
29

30

31

See generally Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of
Decision-Making (1785) in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33–70 (Keith Michael Baker
ed., 1976).
Id. at 61–63.
Id. at 48–49 (“One finds further that if the probable truth of the vote of each voter is
greater than 1/2, that is to say if it is more probable than not that he will decide in conformity with the truth, the more the number of voters increases, the greater the probability of the truth of the decision. The limit of this probability will be certainty . . . .”).
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING
DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 8–10 (2009); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW
AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 25–33 (2009) (examining Condorcet’s Jury Theorem).
Condorcet articulated several other limitations on the Jury Theorem, but they are either
not relevant to this discussion or they have been rejected by later scholars. See Bernard
Grofman et al., Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 268–
269 (1983) (explaining that group members need not be homogenous); Christian List &
Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL.
PHIL. 277, 284 (2001) (explaining that the Jury Theorem applies even when voters
choose from more than two options). For an argument that the Jury Theorem will have
limited applicability in real world conditions, see VERMEULE, supra note 30.
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2. What Is the Question?
Technically, the Jury Theorem only shows that crowds will be likely to produce right answers to questions of fact for which answers can
32
be correct or incorrect. But, from the perspective of democratic decision-making, it should not matter whether a group is answering a
fact question or an opinion question. Imagine the country is asked to
vote on whether or not to allow the death penalty. Some voters will
interpret this question as one of means-ends rationality and ask which
policy will best maximize positive outcomes, like public safety, and
minimize negative outcomes, like expense. Others will take a more
Kantian approach and simply ask which outcome is consistent with
the dictates of justice. Within each group, the Jury Theorem should
hold, since each group is answering a question about the fit between
an agreed-upon set of values or goals and a particular policy. This is
the kind of question susceptible to right answers. As a result, a majority of voters will reliably support the policy most conducive to achieving the majority’s goals. If most Americans are utilitarians and abolishing the death penalty maximizes overall utility, a majority will
33
support abolition.
Of course, voters will also be implicitly choosing between two
frames for answering the general question: utilitarian and Kantian.
This decision may not have a right answer in the traditional sense.
But, one could still feel that it is exactly the kind of question that
should be committed to democratic majorities. Normative questions
that cannot be settled by reasoning from shared values must be settled somehow, and majority rule is at least as appropriate as any other
approach.
The Jury Theorem tells us that each group—utilitarian and Kantian—is more likely to find a policy that achieves its ends by submitting
the question to democratic decision-making. Democratic principles
32
33

See Condorcet, supra note 27, at 38.
For a mathematical proof of this, see Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Electorates, and Democracy: Some Extensions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in 2 INFORMATION
POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 177–83 (Bernard Grofman &
Guillermo Owen eds., 1986). This result can be expected except where the majority
group is not much larger than the minority group and is significantly worse at calculating
the best policies for achieving its ends. Id. at 178–79. Even in this situation, to the extent
that the majority group displays less competence because it cares less about a particular
issue, the democratic process might be said to succeed even when it produces an outcome that does not reflect the best means of achieving the majority’s goals. Id. at 182–83.
Seeing no evidence that the NLRA provides an example of this limit on the Jury Theorem’s logic, I ignore this limit here.
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say that the best way to decide which goals to pursue—when underlying values do not provide an answer—is to submit the question to ma34
Democracy is thus a dominant strategy even when
jority rule.
groups face policy questions that cannot be clearly reduced to ques35
tions of fact.
3. Average Likeliness of Being Correct
For the Jury Theorem to hold true, the average member of a
group must do a better job of getting a question right than random
36
chance. This seems like a low bar. Individuals would almost have to
consciously avoid the right answer in order to be less accurate than
37
random chance. But, group members might be consistently wrong
in two situations: when they are subject to group biases and when
38
they face questions about which they have no information. This
suggests the first limitation on the super-statute theory. To the extent
that statutes appear to be the product of systematic biases or to cover
topics on which individuals have no expertise, they should not be
considered super-statutes.
4. Independence of Opinions
Finally, the Jury Theorem presupposes that voters’ preferences are
independent. But, it is unclear both what type of independence is
necessary and how well the Theorem stands up in situations of less
39
than perfect independence. If the Theorem required that each voter be completely uninfluenced by any other voter, it would have little
34
35

36

37
38
39

Here, this Article ignores a number of obvious problems with majority rule. They will be
discussed below.
Sunstein elides the fact/opinion distinction by pointing out that many questions of morality can be said to have better and worse answers. See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments:
Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1044 (2005).
Condorcet also believed that moral questions should be seen as having right and wrong
answers. Condorcet, supra note 27, at 33–34. Whether or not this is true, the Jury Theorem may still apply to questions of policy that combine questions that have right and
wrong answers with questions that do not.
Condorcet, supra note 27, at 56–57, 60–61. The theorem was initially interpreted as requiring every citizen be more likely than random chance to get the right answer. Modern
theorists have made clear that the wisdom of a given crowd depends on its average member. See Grofman et al., supra note 31, at 268–69 (emphasizing the importance of juror
competence in driving correct verdicts).
Id.
See Condorcet, supra note 27, at 56–57, 60–61 (listing the required conditions to secure
these two essential conditions); Sunstein, supra note 35, at 975–76.
See VERMEULE, supra note 30, at 30 (finding it unclear “whether, and to what extent, independence is compromised by the common deliberation or discussion”).
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to say about contemporary democracy. Few voters are likely to go to
the polls without having been swayed by at least one other voter.
Fortunately, a modified version of the Theorem can be justified
40
even if voters do not have completely independent preferences.
When opinion leaders are divided on a policy question, large groups
will be likely to get the question right, even if many of them blindly
41
follow a given leader on most issues. This is even truer when there
are numerous opinion leaders and when leaders do not succeed in
42
swaying their flock to a particular position. Thus, a statute passed
during a contentious time, when citizens cannot get a clear signal
from a single opinion leader, will be more likely to reflect correct answers to policy questions.
C. The Incentives Rationale
Deference to super-statutes may also facilitate citizen participation
and system stability and responsiveness. Citizens decide whether to
engage in collective action in part based on whether they think of
43
themselves or their group as politically efficacious. And, citizens are
more likely to feel politically efficacious if they have experienced po44
litical successes in the past. If citizens mobilize and achieve a legisla40

41
42
43

44

See, e.g., Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises, 29
ECON. & PHIL. 87, 87 (2013) (proving that “large crowds are fallible but better than small
groups”).
Robert E. Goodin & Kai Spiekerman, Courts of Many Minds, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 555, 570
(2012) (discussing the impact of opinion leaders on group decisions).
Id.
In the words of an early and influential statement of this thesis, “the self-confident citizen
is likely to be the active citizen.” GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC
CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 206 (1989). Almond
and Verba’s insight has been confirmed repeatedly. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Karp & Susan A.
Banducci, Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behaviour, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 311, 326–28 (2008) (Eng.) (analyzing
the relationship between efficacy and voter participation).
Albert Bandura, a psychologist, has demonstrated that past successes exert a powerful
influence on individual and collective self-efficacy, even leading diagnosed phobics to
overcome deep-seated fears about particular activities. See Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy
Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 122, 126, 137 (1982) (“That perceived selfefficacy operates as a cognitive mechanism by which controllability reduces fear arousal.”). Other scholars have taken Bandura’s insights and tested the impact of political successes and failures on feelings of self-efficacy. Douglas Madsen finds that Indians who
had successfully petitioned their government for assistance had higher feelings of selfefficacy. Douglas Madsen, Political Self-Efficacy Tested, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 571, 577
(1987) (“The successful petitioners typically show a sense of self-efficacy that is well above
the norm . . . .”). Similarly, Christopher J. Anderson and Andrew J. LoTempio find that
Americans who vote for losing presidential candidates have less trust in the political system than those who vote for winners. See Christopher J. Anderson & Andrew J. LoTem-
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tive outcome only to find their achievement whittled away by the
courts, their feeling of collective efficacy will rationally diminish. The
impact may be worse than if a mobilized group never succeeded in
45
changing the law. When citizens do not get the votes in Congress to
pass their proposals, they may be inclined to try harder next time
with more allies and a better legislative strategy. When citizens feel
their political achievements have been demolished by politically unaccountable actors, they have no reason to try again in the political
46
realm.
Even those who do not have any special attachment to political
mobilization as such can support a model that rewards mobilized citizens by treating their legislative accomplishments as presumptively
privileged. Those with the political commitment to mobilize in the
first place may be dangerous if their efforts cannot be integrated into
47
the political order. To the extent that they continue to express their
political preferences within the system, they are more likely to accept
48
the system as legitimate. Thus, encouraging political action within
established lawmaking procedures not only makes the political system
49
more responsive, it makes it more stable.

45

46

47

48

49

pio, Winning, Losing and Political Trust in America, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 335, 341–44 (2002)
(Eng.).
Bandura finds that individuals experience a greater decline in feelings of self-efficacy in
response to failures when they feel that their failures were not caused by a lack of effort.
Bandura, supra note 44, at 126. His finding corresponds with common sense. If individuals believe that they can succeed by trying harder, they are less likely to take their failures as a reason to quit.
This may sound like an argument against any kind of judicial review, but it is not. It
merely recognizes that judicial review is likely to have a more significant de-mobilizing effect when it acts on legislation that was the product of popular deliberation. Of course,
this de-mobilizing impact must still be weighed against other values, like the importance
of upholding constitutional principles and protecting minorities.
Evidence from other countries suggests that those with low levels of trust in the government and a general perception that they cannot have an impact on government policy
are the most likely to engage in disruptive political activity. See Mitchell A. Seligson, Trust,
Efficacy and Modes of Political Participation: A Study of Costa Rican Peasants, 10 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 75, 97–98 (1980) (Eng.) (“Third World peasants with low trust in government are the
ones most likely to become involved in mobilized political participation.”).
It is fairly intuitive that those who place more trust in the political system will participate
more. Studies also indicate that the act of participation increases trust, producing a virtuous circle from the perspective of both participation and system stability. See Steven E.
Finkel, Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis, 29 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 891, 908–909 (1985); see also Richard Nadeau & André Blais, Accepting the Election Outcome: The Effect of Participation on Losers’ Consent 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 553, 560–61 (1993)
(Eng.) (showing that opponents of a new political administration are more likely to view
the administration as legitimate if they voted in the election that put it in power).
Writing during a time of intense political volatility, Arthur H. Miller documented a widespread feeling of political inefficacy and cynicism and concluded that America faced a se-

May 2013]

HOW STATUTES CREATE RIGHTS

1515

D. A Normatively Defensible Definition of Super-statutes
With three justifications for treating super-statutes with special
deference identified, it is worth revisiting the definition of superstatutes. Eskridge and Ferejohn’s definition came mostly from their
analysis of the types of laws that courts already pay special respect.
Since this Article does not rely on general practice as a reason for deferring to super-statutes, it must identify a set of statutes that fit with
the normative justifications discussed above. This dictates a slightly
different definition of “super-statute” than the definition offered by
Eskridge and Ferejohn and provides a principled means for determining which laws are super-statutes and which are not.
First, super-statutes must have been passed during a period in
which citizens had some opportunity to express disapproval of
them—and to block them if desired—either before passage or shortly
after. In a functioning democracy, citizens can be said to have input
50
on legislation in two ways. They may have the ability to influence
their lawmakers by indicating that they will be less likely to support
the reelection of any official who supports a given proposal. This
mechanism depends on the salience of the statute at issue. To the
extent that elected officials believe they could lose votes based on one
position on one bill, they will tend to reflect the voters’ wishes on that
bill, and voters can be said to have effectively participated in the bill’s
51
passage or rejection. Voters may also determine whether a bill pass-

50

51

rious risk of politically motivated violence and instability. See Arthur H. Miller, Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 951, 970–72 (1974). More
recently, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn have asserted that “groups told they have no
prospect of prevailing in political deliberation become radicalized and may drop out of
normal politics” and concluded that “[d]eliberation-ending judicial review is a danger to
democracy itself.” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture:
Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1285 (2009). Even if political
cynicism does not reach the point where it can undermine regime stability, it may nonetheless make effective governance more difficult. Citizens who feel that they have little
ability to influence their government are less likely to comply with the law or to engage in
allegiant behaviors, such as jury service. See PIPPA NORRIS, DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT: CRITICAL
CITIZENS REVISITED 226–27 (2011).
The options are borrowed from Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 45, 50–51 (1963). The analysis that follows is my
own.
The importance of issue salience as a predictor of lawmaker responsiveness to constituent
demands was first suggested in a seminal study by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes
in 1963. Id. at 51–53. Subsequent studies have provided more direct evidence of the importance of salience. See James H. Kuklinski & Donald J. McCrone, Policy Salience and the
Causal Structure of Representation, 8 AM. POL. RES. 139, 151–54 (1980) (showing that representatives are more likely to reflect their constituents’ preferences in roll call votes when
the representatives believe their constituents are focused on the issue in question); Jeffrey
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es by electing the representatives who vote directly on the bill. For
this mechanism to be relevant, a particular legislative proposal must
be salient during an election, such that the election’s victors may
52
claim a mandate to pass that proposal.
These criteria for identifying super-statutes are dictated by each of
the normative justifications, discussed above, for treating superstatutes with special deference. A statute cannot be said to reflect the
will of the people if the people had no way of weighing in on its passage. It is unlikely to take advantage of the people’s wisdom if lawmakers had no reason to take the people’s input into account. And,
treating it with special deference will not encourage political participation if the statute is not the product of public participation in the
first place. Thus, the normative arguments in favor of super-statutes
apply only if super-statutes are defined to exclude laws that are not
the product of public input.
Second, super-statutes must pass during a period when voters
would have access to information regarding their substance and likely
impact. In part, this requirement simply reflects the fact that if citizens have little information regarding a statute prior to its passage,
they will not be able to effectively communicate their position on the
proposal to their representatives, and it cannot be said that those
representatives reflected the collective wisdom that Condorcet
53
showed to be so powerful. The information requirement also reflects the conditions under which the Jury Theorem would predict
that public input will lead to better policy. When more information
is available regarding a proposal, the average citizen is more likely to
correctly determine the proposal’s chances of having a positive im54
pact. However, this requirement should not be overplayed. Provided that citizens have enough information to make their predictions
more likely to be correct than predictions made at random, citizen
55
input will tend to produce the right answer to policy questions.

52

53
54
55

R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness,
103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, 376–80 (2009) (showing increased responsiveness on issues
heavily covered in the press).
For example, during the 2012 election, President Obama highlighted his intention to
raise taxes on high earners, allowing him to claim a mandate after his victory. See Helene
Cooper & Jonathan Weisman, Obama to Insist on Tax Increases for the Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2012, at A1.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See Condorcet, supra note 27, at 56 (“It is necessary, furthermore, that voters be enlightened . . . .”)
See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
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Third, for the Jury Theorem to apply, a super-statute must emerge
from a period when multiple views are expressed, and expressed ef56
fectively, regarding the statute’s value. The Jury Theorem requires
that individual opinions be independent, at least to some extent.
This requirement is not met when one opinion leader dominates
57
public opinion or all opinion leaders agree about a particular policy.
II. THE PASSAGE OF THE NLRA
Part I presented three justifications for treating certain statutes
with special deference. Since these justifications only apply to statutes with certain characteristics, they can be used to derive three prerequisites for a statute to be considered a super-statute. First, a superstatute must pass when voters have information regarding the legislation. Second, it must be a high-salience piece of legislation. And
third, it must divide opinion leaders such that popular support for
the bill cannot be explained simply as citizens being corralled into
supporting a decision made by a relative few. This Part will show that
the NLRA has these prerequisites.
A. Information
By the time the NLRA was signed in July of 1935, voters would
have had plenty of information on the new law. From the beginning
of the 1935 congressional session to when Roosevelt signed the Act
58
on July 5, the New York Times discussed the Act in 258 articles. Fifty
of those articles appeared on the front page. Other large publications printed between ninety-three and 146 articles, with sixteen to
59
fifty-six appearing on the front page. Press coverage focused on
56
57
58

59

See supra Part I.B.4.
See supra Part I.B.4.
To come up with this number, I searched for all New York Times articles containing the
word “Wagner” and the word “labor.” If the headline did not make it clear that the article discussed the proposed NLRA, I scanned the article. Any article that mentioned the
proposal, even if it focused on other subjects, was counted. I excluded articles that merely announced events related to the Act. Wagner also proposed labor reform legislation—
identical in most respects to the NLRA—in 1934. In the period between Wagner’s first
introduction of the bill and the 1934 election, the New York Times discussed the proposal
in 128 articles, including twenty-four on the front page. To come up with this number, I
searched ProQuest for Times articles from the beginning of 1934 to November 4, 1934,
containing the following terms (each of which the Times, at one point, used as the unofficial title of Wagner’s bill): “labor disputes bill,” “Wagner labor,” and “labor board bill.”
The Washington Post printed 136, with fifty-six on the front page. The Los Angeles Times
printed ninety-three with sixteen on the front page. And, the Chicago Daily Tribune printed 146 with twenty-eight on the front page. I chose these papers because they all had
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three elements of the proposed law. First, the law replaced the early
New Deal’s ad hoc arbitration system with a unified national board
for settling most labor disputes. Second, the law established the
principle that a majority in a given bargaining unit can elect a representative for the entire unit. And finally, the law banned what Senator Robert Wagner, the legislation’s sponsor, called “company60
dominated unions.” Americans who had been following the evolution of labor law in the early New Deal period would have recognized
these provisions as answers to three of the most hotly—and publicly—
contested policy questions of the time.
1. Centralized Administration
When the NLRA was introduced, Americans had seen how a decentralized system for adjudicating labor disputes worked in practice,
and they had seen the impact of several attempts to insert greater
centralization into the system. The Roosevelt Administration’s first
attempt to change U.S. labor policy seemed to rely on decentralized
enforcement. Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(“NIRA”) did not establish a mechanism for enforcing its own labor
protections. Its language, similar to language contained in the pre61
amble to the Norris-La Guardia Act, signed into law in 1932, could

60

61

large circulations and represented four different areas of the country. Others have
looked to these publications as presenting different political viewpoints today, and they
appear to have had different perspectives during the New Deal. See, e.g., Todd A. Collins
& Christopher A. Cooper, Case Salience and Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decisions: Toward a New Measure, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1 (2011), http://prq.sagepub.com/content/early/
2011/03/07/1065912911398047. While all four opposed the NLRA, the New York Times
and the Washington Post generally backed Roosevelt and the New Deal. The Los Angeles
Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune did not.
By the term, Wagner meant all unions funded, created, or controlled by employers, including those that allowed substantial amounts of worker participation. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(2)(5) (2006)). See also Green Asks
Labor to Confer on Drive for Wagner Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1935, at 1; Here Are Provisions of
Wagner-Connery Labor Disputes Bill, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jun. 20, 1935, at 8; President Orders
Speed on NRA and Wagner Bills; For Latter ‘In Principle,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1935, at 1.
While the law evolved in several respects as it moved through Congress, these provisions
remained the core of the proposal. Wagner Introduces Labor Bill Seeking Company Union
Ban, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1935, at 1; Wagner’s Labor Bill Goes Through House, L.A. TIMES,
June 20, 1935, at 1.
Compare National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195 (1933)
(“[E]mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; [and] (2) that no employee and no one seeking
employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union
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be seen as directed at the courts, just as the Norris-LaGuardia Act had
been directed at the courts. On the other hand, Section 7(a)’s inclusion in the NIRA suggested that it would be enforced by the National
Recovery Administration (“NRA”) through the NRA’s network of local and industry boards.
President Roosevelt, however, seemed to have other plans. On
August 5, 1933, Roosevelt created what would become known as the
National Labor Board (“NLB”). In hindsight, the move appears to be
a first step toward the creation of a process for labor law adjudication.
At the time, however, it was unclear what Roosevelt intended the NLB
to do. Roosevelt’s statement creating the NLB contained no details
regarding its authority, nor was it accompanied by an executive order
62
authorizing the Board.
Even the Board’s title—one of the few indicators of its status and
mission—was initially unclear. It was originally called the “National
63
Industrial Recovery Adjustment Board,” then the “National Board of
64
65
Arbitration,” and then the “National Mediation Board.” It quickly
66
became the “National Labor Board,” and the name stuck. The shifts
in name reflect fluidity in thinking about the new board. A “board of
arbitration” would be expected to help parties negotiate settlements.
The NLB, on the other hand, could, in theory, do much more. The
vagueness of the title—in contrast to the original title’s specificity—
suggested the possibility of expanding the Board’s mission. Nobody
knew where this would lead. As one press report put it, “[w]hat final

62

63
64
65
66

or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing.”) with Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
102 (2006)) (“[I]t is necessary that [the employee] have full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”).
See The President’s Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1933, at 1. The Board would not receive
official authorization until four months later, after its role as a key player in labor adjudication had already been established. See Roosevelt Order Backs Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20, 1933, at 1.
Form Industrial Board: NRA Establishes Group to End All Industrial Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 1933, at 2.
Announcement on Peace Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1933, at 2; Mediation Board Will Cover Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1933, at 3.
NRA Gives Warning on Racketeering in Recovery Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1933, at 1.
Federation Held Near for Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1933, at 6.
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and permanent form this mediation plan will take is not predicted,
67
and President Roosevelt himself has no set design.”
Whatever Roosevelt’s intent, the Board quickly began to play a
prominent role in resolving labor disputes and developing principles
68
of labor law. Within two weeks of its creation, the NLB had settled a
69
70
coal strike, a hosiery strike involving 15,000 workers, and two
71
strikes in shirt factories. In the process, it developed a strategy for
settling disputes that went beyond facilitating private bargains, to
72
guaranteeing certain labor rights. With the Board continuing to
73
show signs of success, it began to develop a system whereby it would
act as something like a supreme court, resolving disputes that could
not be resolved by a system of regional labor boards, local NRA
74
boards, or the Labor Department’s conciliation service. Finally, after Senator Wagner threatened to resign as NLB chair, the Board secured sole jurisdiction over the nation’s labor disputes. It developed
a plan to have NLB-supervised regional labor boards, rather than local NRA compliance bodies, serve as first-level adjudicators in all la75
bor disputes. When it took over the responsibilities of New York
76
City’s busy labor board on September 29, 1933, the Board appeared
77
to be achieving its goals.
Over the next year and a half, Americans watched the NLB try,
with varying degrees of success, to establish itself as the central regulator of American labor relations. In October of 1933, the Weirton
Steel Corporation declared that it was not bound by an NLB order to
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

74
75

76
77

Roosevelt Appoints Board of 7 to Decide All Disputes Over Industrial Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1933, at 1.
Union Labor Wins Victory Under NRA, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1933, at 1.
Mediators End Coal Walkout; 2 More Tackled, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1933, at 3.
J. Bernard McDonnell, 15,000 End Strike; New Board Scores, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1933, at
1.
Labor Board Settles Two Shirt Strikes; Collective Bargaining in Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 1933, at 1.
See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 59 (1950).
The Board continued to settle and avoid strikes. See 4,000 Garment Workers Return to Jobs
Today, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 5, 1933 at 7; Cleveland Car Strike Averted, WASH. POST, Sept.
11, 1933, at 11; Film Strike Ended by Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1933, at 6; Labor Board
Averts Strike By Air Pilots, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1933, at 5; Labor Board Settles Strike, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1933, at 6; Silk Strike Ended by Wagner Board, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1933, at 3.
It also began to establish procedures for determining union representation without
strikes. See Louis Stark, NRA Gives Labor Right to Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1933, at 4.
Labor Board Adopts “Last Resort” Policy, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1933, at 2.
Labor Board Plans Regional Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1933, at 7; Regional Bodies to End
Strikes: N.R.A. Agencies Plan of National Labor Board: Johnson Wants End of Wordy Warfare or
Resignations, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1933, at 13.
See 130 Strikes Ended by NRA in 3 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1933, at 1.
Wagner to Absorb Whalen NRA Board on Labor Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1933, at 1.
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which it had not consented. The Board fought back in the newspapers and within the Administration, eventually winning Roosevelt’s
78
support and, apparently, the power to enforce its will. But, the
Weirton fight did not establish a centralized system for adjudicating
labor disputes once and for all. In 1935—after replacing the NLB
with a tribunal (called the NLRB) which was intended to have more
79
authority —the Roosevelt Administration backed the NRA against
the new NLRB in a highly public battle for jurisdiction over a labor
80
dispute in the newspaper industry. As the labor boards’ achievements and reversals played out on the front pages of the nation’s
newspapers, Americans had a chance to develop informed opinions
about the desirability of a centralized labor board. By the time Senator Wagner’s NLRA proposal came to the public’s attention, the public had seen how labor disputes go when a central board can impose a
solution and how they go when it cannot.
2. Majority Rule
Prior to 1933, unions gained the right to bargain by bringing to
bear enough economic power that employers decided bargaining was
in their interests. The NIRA set out to make collective bargaining a
matter of legal right, not economic force, and this raised key questions. If unions were no longer going to gain the right to speak for
workers by coercing employers into sitting down at the bargaining table, somebody would need to decide how unions gained the right to
speak and for whom they could speak. Two potential answers to these questions were considered. On the one hand, unions could be
seen as speaking for an entire workplace, provided that they had won
the support of a majority of that workplace. On the other, unions
could be seen as speaking only for their members, with a workplace
minority able to make its own bargain with management. Since neither the NIRA nor America’s past experience with labor relations dictated an approach to this question, Americans watched as one set of
federal officials pursued a policy of majority rule while another did
not.
The pre-NLRA NLRB stuck to the principle of majority rule. In
the Denver Tramway case, decided March 1, 1934, an independent un78
79

80

Coal Men Defy NRA on Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1933, at 5.
The National Labor Board became the National Labor Relations Board on June 30, 1934,
pursuant to Public Resolution 44 and a Roosevelt executive order. Text of Order Establishing New Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1934, at 20.
See Roosevelt Curbs NLRB in Code Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1935, at 1.
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ion that had won a majority of votes cast in a union election sought
81
the right to represent the entire bargaining unit. The NLB sided
with the union. It reaffirmed this approach six months later, when it
ruled that the Houde Engineering Company had to grant a closed
shop to the United Auto Workers union after it won an NLRB elec82
tion.
The Roosevelt Administration took a different approach. After is83
suing an executive order endorsing majority rule, the Administration quickly back-tracked. The day after Executive Order 6580 was
issued, Donald Richberg and Hugh Johnson, the Administration’s
highest-profile labor advisers, declared that the order allowed individuals who had not voted for a union to bargain individually even af84
ter a union had won an election. Richberg and Johnson’s position
got official presidential backing on March 26—less than two months
after the introduction of Executive Order 6580—when the President
negotiated a truce to avert an auto industry strike. The truce called
for a union election in the industry, but without majority rule. Each
union participating in the election would be represented proportion85
ally. Employers greeted the President’s new policy with jubilation.
86
Labor leaders saw it as a betrayal.
As he made the case for labor law reform, Wagner dramatized the
difference between the pluralist approach promoted by the Admin87
istration and his goal of majority rule. Americans considering the
Wagner Act thus had two clear choices defended by prominent and
popular leaders and reflected in concrete policy decisions. They
81

82

83
84
85
86

87

In re Denver Tramway Corp., 1 N.L.B. 64 (1934). It had not, however, won a majority of
potential voters. BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 60; CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT
WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 36 (2005).
In re Houde Eng’g Corp, 1 N.L.B. 87 (1934); Majority to Hold Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
1934, at 1. The Houde decision also imposed a duty to bargain in good faith on the employer, another labor law innovation that would be enshrined in the NLRA. See National
Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006)).
Exec. Order No. 6580 (Feb. 1, 1934), reprinted in DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR BOARD I:
AUGUST 1933–MARCH 1934 vii (1934).
Louis Stark, NRA Denies Slur at Company Union, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1934, at 25.
G. William Domhoff, THE POWER ELITE AND THE STATE: HOW POLICY IS MADE IN AMERICA
89 (1990).
The President’s shift on majority rule may have confused organized labor. The AFL initially backed the President’s truce, with AFL President William Green calling it a “great
step forward for labor.” Louis Stark, Roosevelt Averts Strike; Auto Workers and Makers Hail
Wage Bargaining Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1934, at 1. Just two days later, the New York
Times announced that the auto truce was seen as a blow to organized labor in general and
to the AFL in particular. Louis Stark, A.F. of L. Setback is Seen in Capital in Auto Agreement,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1934, at 1. It is not clear what caused the shift in coverage.
Louis Stark, Wagner Seeks to Outlaw Company-Promoted Union; Bill for Majority Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1935, at 1.
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could choose majority rule as it had been practiced in the Denver
Tramway and Houde decisions, or they could choose the pluralist approach articulated by Johnson and Richberg and reflected in the
88
President’s auto settlement. Both approaches had received extensive media attention. And, both Wagner and his opponents made
clear that the debate over the NLRA represented a choice between
89
the two.
3. Company Unions
90
The NLRA’s provision outlawing company unions settled an ongoing debate between three positions. Unions and their backers took
the position that company-dominated unions—those that were created and financed by employers—were inherently unrepresentative.
These unions distracted employees from real collective empower91
ment and should be fought.
Roosevelt Administration officials occasionally seemed sympathet92
ic to this view, but the mainstream Administration position was more
moderate. According to the Administration, workers could join a

88

89
90

91

92

The Roosevelt Administration’s position never created a completely clear contrast with
the NLRB approach because the Administration never took a clear position. Even after
the auto settlement, the NRA stripped Houde of its Blue Eagle for failing to comply with
an NLRB order based on the principle of majority rule. And, even as the NRA backed
the NLRB in the Houde case, it allowed another company in a similar situation to ignore
the majority view among its workers. Both Houde and the press noticed and objected to
the inconsistency. Edwin J. Lebherze, Editorial Correspondence, NRA Rulings Vary Widely
in Buffalo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1934, at E7.
Harriman Opposes the Wagner Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1935, at 9.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2) (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(2) (2006)). The debate over “company unions” suffered from inconsistencies in
terminology. In the early 1930s, the term “company union” could mean simply a union
that was confined to one company and not affiliated with an outside union. Thus, Wagner could say that the NLRA did not ban company unions. See Louis Stark, Wagner Proposes New Labor Board to Top All Others, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1935, at 1. However, “company
union” could also mean a union dominated by a particular employer. Adopting this definition, the press frequently referred to the NLRA as an effort to ban company unions.
See, e.g., Louis Stark, Wagner Seeks to Outlaw Company-Promoted Union; Bill for Majority Rule,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1935, at 1. The confusion allowed officials of all stripes to avoid making clear their position on company-dominated unions.
See Holds Threats Bar Labor’s Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1933, at 11; Recovery Plan at
Stake: Workers Give Notice They Will Battle to Last for Bargaining Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
1933, at 1 [hereinafter Recovery Plan at Stake]; Louis Stark, Labor Clash Nears on Code Provisions, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1933, at 11. For a discussion of several reasons for opposition to
company unions, see Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1442–61 (1993).
See Coal Strike Ended on Roosevelt Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1933, at 4; Recovery Plan at Stake,
supra note 91.
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company union, an independent union, or no union at all, as long as
93
the decision was not coerced. The NLB reflected this approach. It
invalidated employer-controlled company unions that were imposed
94
on workers against their will and declared that employers could not
refuse to bargain with an independent union simply by claiming its
95
workers preferred a company union. But, the NLB allowed compa96
ny unions to compete in free elections.
The final approach came from the courts. The setting was the
high-profile case of the Weirton Steel Corporation. Weirton claimed
that its employees preferred to be represented by a company union—
a claim buttressed by the results of a company-run election—and re97
fused the NLB’s demand to run its own election at the company. As
Weirton defied the Board, General Hugh Johnson of the NRA de98
clared war on the company, stripping it of its Blue Eagle and refer99
ring the case to the Attorney General for prosecution. Labor celebrated as the Administration made clear that companies could not
avoid bargaining with an independent union simply by staging an
election to be won by an employer-controlled union.
But, the moment was short-lived. Shortly before Congress began
to act on the NLRA, the judiciary weighed in on the Weirton case. A
federal district court in Delaware ruled that Weirton did not exercise
illegal control over a union, even when the company created the un100
The court reion unilaterally and paid its officers and expenses.
jected the “old world theory” of an “inevitable and necessary diversity
101
of interest” between employer and employee. As long as companies
did not directly coerce employees’ choice of representative, the court
102
held, company unions did not violate the NLRA.

93
94

95
96
97
98

99
100
101
102

Auto Code Signed for 35-Hour Week; Ford Waits to Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1933, at 1.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 60–61 (citing In re Nat’l Lock Co., 1 N.L.B. 15 (1934), In re
Fed. Knitting Mills, 1 N.L.B. 69 (1934), and HARRY A. MILLS & ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY,
ORGANIZED LABOR 845 (1945)).
See MILLS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 94, at 843 n.1 (cataloging several examples of NLB
decisions invalidating company unions).
Id. at 845–47.
Coal Men Defy NRA on Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1933, at 5; Company Unions Defy Labor
Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1933, at 36.
The Blue Eagle is the emblem that was granted to companies that cooperated with the
NRA. Removal of the Blue Eagle was seen as a government invitation to boycott the targeted business. Eagle Forfeit Follows Ouster of Union Men, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1933, at 9.
Labor Heads Call Weir Vote a ‘Joke,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1933, at 3.
United States v. Weirton Steel Co., 10 F. Supp. 55, 61, 84 (D. Del. 1935).
Id. at 86.
Id. The court’s hostility to the government position can be seen by the way it decided the
case. After holding against the government on the company union question, it went on
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Thus, when voters began to see extensive coverage of the NLRA’s
provisions banning company unions, they had already seen what an
anti-company union policy could look like. They had seen the Administration criticize company unions and go to court to challenge
them. And, they had seen the limits of existing law in terms of its
ability to stop employers from creating their own unions and impos103
Even on this relatively technical point
ing them on their workers.
of labor law, Americans had an unusual amount of information available to help shape their opinions.
B. Salience
Americans rarely vote directly on federal policies, but when an issue is particularly salient, the people’s representatives generally do a
104
No opinion polls exist
good job of reflecting popular sentiments.
to directly measure the salience of the NLRA in 1935, but an analysis
of newspaper coverage suggests that the Act was extremely salient
when it passed.
Todd A. Collins and Christopher A. Cooper have developed a
method for evaluating issue salience by examining press coverage af105
They propose analyzing press
ter a particular decision is made.

103

104
105

to find the NLRA unconstitutional as applied to Weirton, a manufacturer who engaged in
interstate commerce only as a subsidiary of the National Steel Company. Id. at 90.
It is worth noting that both the administration’s criticisms of company unions and the
district court’s rejection of those criticisms made front page news across the country. See
supra note 92–93; Company Union Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1935, at 1; Government Loses
Test of N.R.A. in Weirton Steel Suit, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1935, at 1; Johnson Warns Weirton
Steel May Lose Eagle, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 15, 1933, at 1; New Deal Loses Weirton Steel Injunction Suit, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 28, 1935, at 1; NRA’s Section 7-a is Ruled Illegal in Weirton Case, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 28, 1935, at 1; Power is Given to Labor Board, ATLANTA
CONST., Dec. 20, 1933, at 1; Steel Head Unyielding, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1933, at 1.
See supra note 51.
See Todd A. Collins & Christopher A. Cooper, Case Salience and Media Coverage of Supreme
Court Decisions: Toward a New Measure, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1, 1–12 (2011), available at
http://prq.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/03/07/1065912911398047. Collins and
Cooper updated a measure proposed by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal to measure the
salience of judicial opinions. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience,
44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 66–83 (2000). While Epstein and Segal’s measure is binary—issues
are either salient or not—and focuses on only the front page of only one publication—
the New York Times—Collins and Cooper have developed a measure that allows for comparisons across issues and takes into consideration coverage in multiple papers. Collins &
Cooper, supra at 1–3. While the measure was developed to evaluate judicial decisions, it
can be used to measure salience in any situation where opinion polling is unavailable or
unhelpful. See Epstein & Segal, supra at 79–80. There are compelling reasons to think
newspaper coverage would correlate with issue salience among the general public.
Newspapers interested in keeping customers are likely to disproportionately cover issues
in which their readers are interested. And newspaper coverage may in turn increase issue
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coverage the day after the decision in four geographically and ideo106
logically diverse newspapers. If a paper covered the decision on the
front page, the decision gets two salience points. If the decision was
covered elsewhere in the paper, it gets one point. If it was not cov107
ered, it gets no points.
The NLRA gets a perfect eight points on the Collins-Cooper scale,
as do iconic statutes such as the Voting Rights Act. Even the Social
Security Act scores only a seven, as the Chicago Tribune chose not to
give it front page coverage. Other indicators confirm the CollinsCooper measure of salience. In the thirty days before it was signed
108
into law, the NLRA was discussed in forty-one front page articles
109
from the four papers considered by Collins and Cooper. The Voting Rights Act appeared in just thirty-six front page articles in the
110
thirty days before it became law. Social Security was mentioned in
111
just thirty-two articles.
C. Open Debate
The final indicator that a bill is a super-statute may also be the
least common. Super-statutes’ tendency to capture the wisdom of
crowds is diminished to the extent that opinion leaders unanimously
112
Therefore, a true super-statute should
back a given proposal.
emerge from a period in which leaders and interest groups loudly

106

107
108

109

110
111
112

salience among those readers. See Spiro Kiousis, Explicating Media Salience: A Factor Analysis of New York Times Issue Coverage During the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, 54 J. OF
COMM. 71, 71 (2004)(summarizing the research on “agenda-setting” by the media).
Those papers are the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune. See Collins & Cooper, supra note 105, at 4. These papers represented a diversity of
views during the New Deal. The Los Angeles Times was an “Independent Republican” paper in 1935, N. W. AYER & SON’S DIRECTORY OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 87 (1935),
as was the Chicago Tribune, id. at 215. The New York Times was “Independent Democratic.”
Id. at 646. The Washington Post was simply “Independent.” Id. at 144.
See Collins & Cooper, supra note 105, at 6.
The count of articles that discuss a particular piece of legislation comes from searching
for the various titles of the legislation in ProQuest. I count an article as discussing the
legislation if it mentions the legislation at least once. I excluded news items that were
merely announcing that the legislation would be discussed on the radio or on television.
For the NLRA, I searched for the following key words, all of which capture a title that
newspapers used to describe the Act: “wagner labor disputes,” “wagner disputes bill,”
“‘wagner bill’ and ‘labor,’” and “wagner-connery.” I spot-checked the results to ensure
that they only contain articles which actually discuss the NLRA.
To find articles on the Voting Rights Act, I searched ProQuest for articles containing the
term “voting bill,” “voting rights bill,” “voting rights law,” or “voting law.”
To find articles on the Social Security Act, I searched ProQuest for any article containing
the term “social security.”
See supra notes 39–42, and accompanying text.
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and effectively proclaimed different views on the issue at hand. It is
unusual for open debate to prevail when a mobilized populace appears passionate about a given policy proposal. However, the NLRA
emerged from a period of open debate.
The main source of criticism of New Deal labor policy was, not
surprisingly, the business community. Business groups repeatedly accused the NLB and the NLRB of creating conditions under which
113
Some businesses threatAmerican employers could not survive.
ened to boycott the NRA code system to send a message to the Ad114
ministration about its approach to labor law, while others simply re115
fused to comply with NLB orders. One company even shut down its
operations—throwing 653 people out of work—to protest an NRA ac116
tion.
Another prime source of negative information about the NLRA
was the country’s newspapers. Newspapers almost unanimously edi117
torialized against the proposal. They also provided detailed coverage of opponents’ arguments against it. When business leaders argued that the NLRA would stop an otherwise inevitable recovery, they
118
made front page news. When named or unnamed individuals questioned the constitutionality of the proposal, they also received front

113
114

115

116
117

118

Warns NRA to Stop Raising of Wages: Durable Goods Board Suggests That Specific Needs Precede
Price-Fixing Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1934, at 1.
Louis Stark, Dropping of Steel Code to Escape Labor Clause Considered by Industry: Hinges on
Board Rulings: Move is Urged to Avoid Unwelcome Collective Bargaining, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1934, at 1.
Houde Firm Is Stripped of Blue Eagle For Its Refusal to Bargain With Union, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1934, at 1. After one particularly controversial NLB ruling, the National Association
of Manufacturers advised its members not to comply with NLB decisions. Employers Defy
Bargaining Rule: Manufacturers’ Association Advises Members to Ignore Labor Board Decision,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1934, at 1.
Plant Doors Shut by Harriman Mills as Answer to NRA: Johnson Charged with Trying to Wreck
Concern by Taking Blue Eagle From It: 653 Employees are Out, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1934, at 1.
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 67–68. The newspapers’ objection to the proposed law
may have had something to do with publishers’ conflict with the pre-NLRA NLRB. After
the Board accused a San Francisco paper of a discriminatory firing, the publishers rallied
behind the paper and convinced the Roosevelt Administration that the Board had no jurisdiction in the case. See 1,200 Newspapers to Decide if Code Has Been Breached: Action Follows Reassertion by Labor Board of Jurisdiction in San Francisco Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1934,
at 1. The NLRA unambiguously gave the NLRB jurisdiction over the publishers, as Wagner made clear. See Louis Stark, Wagner Seeks to Outlaw Company-Promoted Union; Bill for
Majority Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1935, at 1.
Industry Sees Recovery at Once if Congress Shelves New Laws: Manufacturers Could Spend
$20,000,000,000 in Factory Expansion and Rehabilitation, Giving 4,000,000 Jobs, if New Deal
Bills Are Sidetracked, They Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1935, at 1; Steel Men Decry Curbs to Recovery: Grace Says Industry, Ready for Prosperity, Is Held Back by New Deal’s Uncertainty, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1935, at 1; Views of C. of C. on NRA, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1935, at 1.
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page coverage.119 One front page headline informed New York Times
readers that a prominent business leader would rather be imprisoned
than obey labor regulations like those contained in Wagner’s pro120
When Wagner’s proposal passed the House, the Chicago
posal.
Tribune news coverage summarized it in two sentences: “It would give
the American Federation of Labor great power. It has been frequent121
ly called unconstitutional.”
Of course, the biggest force in early New Deal America was almost
certainly the Roosevelt Administration, generally considered an ally
of organized labor. But the Roosevelt Administration was never a
clear or consistent supporter of the NLRA. President Roosevelt eventually supported the NLRA, but his support was both late and tepid.
When Wagner first made a labor reform proposal, in 1934, the Ad122
The White
ministration declined to publicly support the bill.
House played no part in drafting Wagner’s proposal and took no official position on it. The Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, made
123
noncommittal statements, while General Johnson said nothing.
Lacking presidential support, Wagner withdrew his proposal in favor
of a plan, backed by Roosevelt, which would give the President discretion to create a new labor board without making any changes in labor
124
law.
In 1935, Wagner again proposed systemic reforms, and again, the
Administration did not participate in the drafting or take a public position on the proposal’s merits. When the White House chose not to
endorse the proposal, its silence was heard loud and clear by the me125
Only Secretary Perkins expressed belatdia, weakening Wagner.
119
120
121
122

123
124
125

See, e.g., Sibley Makes Plea Here: Chamber Head Urges Employers to Guard Hours and Wages, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 1935, at 1; Wagner Bill, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 20, 1935, at 1.
‘Rather Go to Jail’ than Accept Wagner Bill, Says U.S. Steel Executive, Getting Medal, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 1935, at 1.
Labor and Old Age Bills Win: Congress Acts as Roosevelt Asks New Taxes; Wants Big Fortunes
Split, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 20, 1935, at 1.
The White House’s silence allowed some papers to portray the Wagner Bill as part of the
President’s agenda, but those close to the legislative process knew better. See Leon H.
Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199,
203.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 68.
J. Warren Madden, The Origin and Early History of the National Labor Relations Board, 29
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 234, 237–38 (1960).
Louis Stark, Grave Labor Issues Facing White House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1935, at E11 (documenting organized labor’s disaffection with the Roosevelt Administration); Louis Stark,
Wagner Seeks to Outlaw Company-Promoted Union: Bill for Majority Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1935, at 1 (noting the lack of administration support for the Wagner Act). It is unclear
whether the Administration’s public silence indicates ambivalence regarding Wagner’s
proposal or just political caution. Leon Keyserling—Wagner’s chief aide and somebody
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ed126 support for Wagner’s effort, and her support was contingent on
127
any permanent NLRB being located within the Labor Department.
When Wagner would not concede that point, Perkins promised to
128
scuttle his bill. Most assumed the President was on her side. The
President finally endorsed the NLRA on March 24, 1935, after the bill
had already been passed overwhelmingly by both houses of Con129
gress.
The passage of the NLRA cannot be explained as the result of
powerful opinion leaders dragging their followers toward a foregone
conclusion. Americans witnessed a contest between organized labor
and organized business, with the latter making strong claims that the
NLRA was inconsistent with American values and economic recovery.
While many Americans likely made up their minds about the Wagner
Act based on interest group influence, the various interest groups
competing for support during this time gave Americans a choice of
whom to follow, with blind supporters of labor or business likely to
cancel each other out.
D. Summary
Given the information available to Americans regarding the
NLRA, the interest voters took in the matter, and the diverse viewpoints expressed by powerful opinion leaders when the bill was under
consideration, the NLRA provides an ideal example of a super-statute
entitled to judicial deference. But, what kind of deference? In the

126

127
128
129

with an obvious incentive to put his boss and not President Roosevelt at the center of the
NLRA victory—has suggested that President Roosevelt invited Senator Wagner to a White
House meeting where other senators attempted to convince Wagner to withdraw his proposal. Keyserling, supra note 122, at 202–03. Keyserling concludes that the President
never fully supported Wagner’s plan. Id. at 203.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 105; Louis Stark, Wagner Proposes New Labor Board to Top All
Others: Offers His Bill for National Independent Body to Assure Equality Under Sec. 7a, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1935, at 1; see also Biddle Backs the Bill: Wagner Measure Called Vital to Existence of Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1934, at 5; Elimination of 7A Urged by Biddle: Labor
Relations Board Head Tells Senate Committee the Section Is Unenforceable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1934, at 8.
Labor Secretary Backs Wagner Bill: But Miss Perkins Opposes Making Board Independent of Her
Department, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1935, at 12.
Louis Stark, Labor’s Pet Bills Run Into Trouble: President Refuses to Commit Himself to Guffey
Coal Stabilization Measure, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1935, at 22.
NLRB Legislative History, at 3112. Even after the Administration officially endorsed the
bill, disagreement within the Administration could be seen. Both Houses Clear Wagner Labor Bill: Conference Report on ‘Must’ Measure Is Quickly Adopted and President Will Sign It, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 1935, at 6 (“Passage of the bill making the board independent was a disappointment to Secretary Perkins.”). For an argument that Roosevelt’s support came too
late to make a difference, see Keyserling, supra note 122, at 203.
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next Part, I conclude by applying the super-statute concept to a frequently criticized labor law case and showing how doctrine would
look different if courts took super-statutes seriously.
III. A SUPER-STATUTE IN PRACTICE: REINTERPRETING THE NLRA
Parts I and II argued that the NLRA should be treated as a superstatute. This Part will explain what that would look like in practice by
considering a Supreme Court case that would have come out differently if the Court had treated the NLRA as a super-statute. Lechmere,
130
Inc. v. NLRB, has been criticized by pro-labor academics, but these
critics have not provided an alternative framework for analysis that
they would be willing to apply consistently. The theory of superstatutes provides such a framework.
A. The Trouble with Lechmere
The Lechmere case began when union organizers from the United
Food and Commercial Workers (“UFCW”) were removed from the
parking lot of a retail store owned by Lechmere, Inc., where they had
131
The
been leaving handbills on the cars of the store’s employees.
union had already reached out to workers through newspaper ads
132
with no success. After they were removed from the parking lot, they
tried carrying signs on a narrow strip of grass near the store as a
means of informing workers about the ongoing organizing cam133
134
paign. This too failed.
The UFCW filed a complaint with the NLRB accusing Lechmere
of an unfair labor practice. The Board ruled that under the circumstances, Lechmere had a duty to provide the organizers access to
135
136
The First Circuit agreed, but the Supreme
company property.
Court reversed. According to the Court, organizers are not protected
137
Secby the NLRA’s Section 7, which speaks only of “employees.”
138
tion 7 applies to organizers “only derivatively” and must be bal139
Thus, the rights of oranced against employers’ property rights.
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

502 U.S. 527 (1992).
Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 529–30.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92, 92, 97–98 (1989).
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313, 324–25 (1st Cir. 1990).
Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 531–32.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 537.
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ganizers can be overridden provided employees have some way of
140
learning that an organizing drive is taking place.
141
Much of the
Lechmere has drawn extensive scholarly criticism.
criticism relates not to the Court’s reasoning in Lechmere but to its
reasoning in a case the Lechmere Court relied on: NLRB v. Babcock &
142
Like Lechmere, Babcock presented a conflict between
Wilcox Co.
property rights and the NLRA. The Court responded by balancing
the rights protected by the NLRA against the employer’s property
rights, with the result that the Court allowed the employer to exclude
organizers. A balancing test was necessary, the Court reasoned, because “[o]rganization rights are granted to workers by the same au143
thority, the National Government, that preserves property rights.”
144
Of course, as many scholars have pointed out, this is simply untrue.
NLRA rights flow from the national government, but property rights
are rooted in state common law. When the two conflict, the former
should control.
If the Lechmere Court had balanced statutory rights granted by the
NLRA against common law property rights, it could rightly be criticized for grafting a judicial exception onto Congress’s statute. But, it
is not clear that this is what the Court did. The Court’s reasoning relies less on a decision to balance statutory rights against property
rights than on a conclusion that union organizers do not have any
statutory rights to begin with. After all, the Lechmere Court concluded
that organizers are not employees, and only employees have Section 7
145
If the Court went on to balance organizers’ “derivative”
rights.
rights against employers’ property rights, this represents not so much
a diminution of statutory rights as a creation of nonstatutory rights,
albeit weak ones. In other words, if organizers are not employees
within the meaning of the NLRA, the Lechmere Court might be criti-

140
141

142
143
144

145

Id. at 539–40.
See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 223, 268 (2005); Cynthia L. Estlund, supra note 3, at 305; Moshe Zvi Marvit, On the
Greatest Property Transfer That Wasn’t: How the National Labor Relations Act Chose Employee
Rights and the Supreme Court Chose Property Rights, 38 S.U. L. REV. 79, 103 (2010); see also Michael L. Stevens, Comment, The Conflict Between Union Access and Private Property Rights:
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB and the Question of Accommodation, 41 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1337 n.99
(summarizing criticism of Lechmere in the press).
351 U.S. 105 (1956).
Id. at 112.
See Cynthia L. Estlund, supra note 3, at 311, 334; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property
Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. REV. 891, 944 (2006); James Gray Pope, How
Americans Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 543–44 (2004).
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992).
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cized for giving them rights not provided by that statute, but it cannot
be criticized for diluting rights that never existed in the first place.
Thus, the question in Lechmere is simply whether union organizers
are “employees” under the NLRA. The Supreme Court did not do
itself any favors when it reasoned through this question. Rather than
look to the text of the NLRA, the Court seemed to assume that employees are protected only from interference by their own employ146
er. Thus, Lechmere could clearly remove organizers from its property, as these organizers were not employed by Lechmere. As
147
scholars have pointed out, this assumption is clearly wrong. The
NLRA provides that the term “employee” is not limited to the em148
If Pepsi employees want to enployees of a particular employer.
gage in collective action, Coke could not interfere any more than
Pepsi could.
Some scholars end the analysis here and conclude that the
149
Lechmere Court simply misread the NLRA. But, the Act has more to
say about the definition of “employee.” Employees must be employed by an employer, and unions, according to the statute, are not
150
While the Court never said as much, its ruling in
employers.
Lechmere could plausibly be read as an interpretation of the language
in the NLRA that renders unions non-employers and their employees
non-employees.
Professor James Gray Pope has a response to this argument. He
looks to the intent of the NLRA and concludes that unions were exempted from the Act’s definition of employer so that they would not
be covered by other provisions limiting the ability of employers to
151
participate in workers’ decisions regarding union representation.
Since the Act exempted unions from the definition of employer in
order to enhance their ability to organize workers, argues Pope, it
would be “ironic” to interpret this exemption in such a way as to deny
152
organizers protections needed to reach unorganized workers.

146
147

148
149
150

151
152

Id.
Estlund, supra note 3, at 326 (“The literal terms of the Act should thus make it unlawful
for an employer to interfere with efforts to ‘assist’ a union by employees other than its
own, including union organizers.”); Pope, supra note 144, at 541–43.
National Labor Relations Act § 2(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)).
Estlund, supra note 3, at 326.
National Labor Relations Act § 2(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006)) (“The term
‘employer’ . . . shall not include . . . any labor organization (other than when acting as an
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.”).
Pope, supra note 144, at 542.
Id.
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Professor Cynthia Estlund has another response. According to
Estlund, “[t]he economic theory of unionism, which the framers of
the 1935 Wagner Act largely adopted, recognizes that the effectiveness of collective bargaining depends on a union’s ability to organize
153
across employer lines.” Union organizing is a collective act between
organized workers and those they—through union organizers acting
154
Since Section 7 protects collecas their agents—seek to organize.
tive action, it must protect union organizers—not because organizers
enjoy “derivative rights” based on the rights of unorganized workers,
but because they are directly protected by the Section 7 rights of the
155
organized workers they represent.
Both Pope and Estlund rely on a particular vision of what the
NLRA sought to accomplish. Pope focuses on the intent of Congress
in exempting unions from the definition of “employer.” Estlund focuses on the “economic theory of unionism” that motivated the
NLRA. But, both arguments work only to the extent that readers or
courts are willing to look beyond the text of the Act to the intent of
Congress in passing it. Not everybody is willing to make this move.
B. Lechmere, New Textualism, and Hoffman Plastic
At one point, most courts would have followed Pope and Estlund
in consulting indicators of congressional intent other than the statute
156
Today, courts tend to take statutes at face value.157 In
itself.
Lechmere, this approach would favor the outcome the Court reached.
Since union organizers are not clearly covered by the text of the statute, courts would have to look to the statute’s purpose to find organizer protections.

153
154
155
156

157

Estland, supra note 3, at 327.
Id.
Id. at 326–28.
See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar
rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626–27 (1990) (describing the
“traditional” approach to statutory interpretation, which uses non-textual sources to ferret out congressional intent).
See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 156, at 656–66 (documenting the rise of New
Textualism in the Supreme Court). The change in approach does not necessarily reflect
a change in doctrine. Courts might agree that they will look beyond the text of a statute
only when the text is unclear, while disagreeing vehemently about when a statutory text is
unclear. In practice, the rise of New Textualism does not foreclose the use of extratextual sources, but it does limit the circumstances under which these sources will be decisive.
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Courts’ tendency to focus on the text of statutes reflects the influence of a set of ideas that can be roughly attributed to the New Tex158
tualism Movement. New Textualists justify their approach by attacking the idea that laws generally reflect a coherent purpose beyond
the provisions contained in their texts. Legislation is almost always
159
the product of compromise. Reformers may have achieved enough
power to change the status quo, but they have inevitably compromised with some lawmakers and interest groups who would rather
preserve the status quo and others that would prefer different changes. Judges who expand a law to achieve more than the text demands
have privileged one side of a negotiation over another, giving an interest group more than it could win at the bargaining table. This, ac160
cording to the New Textualists, is not the judge’s role.
Some scholars go further, arguing that the whole idea of group intent is incoherent. Relying on Public Choice Theory, and particularly
161
the work of Kenneth Arrow, these writers argue that it simply makes
no sense to speak of the intent of a group the way we speak of the intent of an individual. Legislation is the contingent product of a particular set of circumstances and procedures. Asking what a group of
lawmakers would have thought about an issue it never in fact considered is like asking who would have won a sporting competition, and
by how much, without specifying the rules of the game. When courts
attribute an unexpressed purpose to a legislative text, they are simply

158
159

160

161

See id. at 626–27.
This idea has been popularized in large part by scholars in the law-and-economics tradition, who see policymaking as a process of negotiation and compromise between competing interest groups. Just as a contract negotiated between Walmart and General Motors
cannot be said to have the general intent of promoting either party’s values, a statute negotiated between different interest groups and their congressional champions cannot be
said to represent any one party’s views of the world. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875,
894 (1975); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227–33 (1986).
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (Scalia, J.);
Hrubec v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 1269, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.)
(“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will
or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of
legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically
to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987)); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 546 (1983) (“[J]udicial pursuit of the ‘values’ or
aims of legislation is a sure way of defeating the original legislative plan.”).
See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 204 (2d ed. 1963).
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imposing their own values on something that, on its own, has no such
162
thing.
The New Textualist approach reflects the common sense wisdom
that if it ain’t broke, courts should not fix it. The status quo, whatever its flaws, enjoys a presumption of validity if only because we have
163
learned to live with it. Nobody would want to live in a world where
164
everything is in flux at every moment.
The criticisms of Lechmere discussed above could be seen as predicated on the belief that New Textualism is the wrong way to do statutory interpretation. But, I suspect that Pope and Estlund would not
always agree with an approach to statutory interpretation that reads
statutes expansively to reflect a court’s interpretation of statutory
purpose. For example, both have expressed their disagreement with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
165
166
NLRB to read the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
167
Yet,
(“IRCA”) as precluding backpay for undocumented workers.
that case is easily defensible if courts can expand statutory texts to reflect a plausible reading of congressional intent. Even Estlund has
168
admitted that Congress was “exquisitely ambiguous” on the question of backpay when it passed the IRCA. It seems likely that many of
the members of Congress who supported the IRCA intended to deny
undocumented workers any benefit tied in any way to the employment relationship. The Court’s error in Hoffman Plastic was not that
it chose an indefensible interpretation of congressional intent, but
that it chose one interpretation and elevated it above the text of the
162

163

164

165
166
167

168

See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 38–42 (1991); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2001).
See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921,
937 (1992); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 891–92 (1996); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 264–65
(1986) (arguing that statutes interfere with efficient common law rules).
See Strauss, supra note 163, at 892 (“[I]t is simply too time consuming and difficult to
reexamine everything from the ground up.”); Cass Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105
MICH. L. REV. 353, 362–86 (2006). While Sunstein does not identify with Burke’s support
for tradition as such, he agrees with the Burkeans that “[n]o real-world minimalist is likely to want to subject many traditions to critical scrutiny, at least not at the same time.”
Sunstein, supra at 367.
535 U.S. 137 (2002).
Pub. L. No. 99-603, Title I, § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1324a).
See Cynthia Estlund, The Supreme Court’s Labor and Employment Cases of the 2001–2002 Term,
18 LAB. LAW. 291, 316–17 (2002); James Gray Pope, A Free Labor Approach to Human Trafficking, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1868 (2010).
Estlund, supra note 167, at 315.
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Act. While the Court’s outcome is no doubt reprehensible to Estlund
and Pope (and to me), its approach to interpreting the IRCA is consistent with their approach to interpreting the NLRA.
The theory of super-statutes allows courts to avoid the outcome in
Lechmere without risking the outcome in Hoffman Plastic. It counsels a
purposivist approach to statutes like the NLRA and a New Textualist
169
And, it provides a principled
approach to statutes like the IRCA.
means for determining when to adopt the former approach and
when to adopt the latter.
This is because the justifications for New Textualism ring hollow
when courts interpret super-statutes. To understand why, it helps to
remember that statutes are not black marks on a white background.
When courts choose to apply preexisting law—whether derived from
the common law or from a statute—they engage in lawmaking every
bit as much as when they apply principles derived from statutes.
Courts are condemned to choose. The question is whether they will
choose the status quo or the statutory change to the status quo.
Under normal circumstances, there are compelling reasons to
stick with the status quo. Further, it may be difficult for courts to
identify and apply a unifying principle embedded in a statute. When
a court interprets a super-statute, however, the status quo has generally been rejected. The kind of popular mobilization that occurs when
a super-statute is passed is unlikely when Americans are broadly satisfied with the way things are. Thus, the New Textualist bias in favor of
the status quo is inappropriate when courts interpret super-statutes.
At the same time, it makes more sense to speak of a collective will in
the context of a statute produced after prolonged public discussion
of the values and ideas that motivate that enactment. When a policy
change follows a period of in-depth public debate, courts should be
able to more easily determine a clear motivating principle behind the
170
change.
169
170

I assume here that the IRCA does not qualify as a super-statute.
Even Judge Easterbrook grants that a broad, purposivist interpretation of statutes is appropriate if statutes were generally intended to serve the public interest. Frank H.
Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1984) (“If
statutes generally are designed to overcome ‘failures’ in markets and to replace the calamities produced by unguided private conduct with the ordered rationality of the public
sector, then it makes sense to use the remedial approach to the construction of statutes—
or at least most of them.”). One way to describe super-statute theory that might be more
acceptable to the law-and-economics tradition is as a claim that when the public is closely
watching its elected representatives on a particular issue, the various collective action
problems that generally prevent public-spirited legislation do not come into play, and
lawmakers generally produce legislation in the public interest. In these cases, generous
statutory interpretation is warranted.
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C. The Lechmere Problem in Other Cases
Lechmere is not the only precedent that would fall if the NLRA received the treatment it deserves. Professor Ellen Dannin has shown
how the remedies available for violations of labor law—one of the
171
most destructive areas of labor law —could be transformed if the
courts interpreted the NLRA in light of what she calls “NLRA val172
ues.” At the same time, many of those areas of labor law doctrine
that protect workers rely on courts treating the NLRA as a superstatute without explicitly justifying the approach. A major part of the
basic foundation of labor law was built more on purpose than on text.
173
In J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, one of the first cases to establish the principle that collective bargaining is inconsistent with individual contracts
between employers and employees, the Supreme Court began by ad174
It
mitting that the language of the NLRA did not settle the issue.
based its ruling instead on “the practice and philosophy of collective
175
bargaining.” If courts and the Board chose to limit the NLRA to its
express terms, even J.I. Case would be in danger.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article was to show that the NLRA deserves better.
Adopting a term made popular by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, I have argued that the NLRA should be treated as a superstatute. Unlike Eskridge and Ferejohn, however, I derived the justification for treating certain statutes with special deference—and thus
the prerequisites for such treatment—from first principles. My goal
in Part I was to develop the beginnings of a normative justification for
the theory of super-statutes. Applying this framework, Part II makes
the case that the NLRA fits a normatively defensible definition of super-statutes. Part III explains why super-statute theory matters. It
shows that pro-labor academics tend to interpret the NLRA in light of
broad principles that go beyond the Act’s text, while denying similar
treatment to other statutes. The super-statute theory provides a justification for this approach and a principled means for determining
when to read a statute broadly. It gives judges a framework for giving
171
172
173
174
175

See Cynthia L. Estlund, supra note 2, at 1537; Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787–96 (1983).
Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
223, 225 (2005).
321 U.S. 332 (1944).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 338.
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the people what they want when they speak with one voice, while
avoiding the problems that can come with expansive interpretations
of everyday statutes.

